Contents
In April 1961, some 1,500 Cuban exiles come ashore on Cuba’s southern coast. Three days later they have surrendered. More than 1,200 of them are taken prisoner. The landing at the Bay of Pigs is the first major decision of the new president, John F. Kennedy – and a failure. Eighteen months later, the same president, with largely the same advisers, faces a far more dangerous situation and decides with great care. The psychologist Irving L. Janis set the two cases side by side. His interpretation leads straight to the Team Principle of Dissent: the more a team agrees, the more urgently it needs someone who disagrees.
A Plan No One Stops
Situation
The plan to overthrow Fidel Castro dates back to the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In March 1960 the CIA presents it to the National Security Council, which approves $13 million. Those in charge are CIA Director Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell. In November 1960 they brief President-elect Kennedy. The landing site is moved from Trinidad to the more remote Bay of Pigs so that US involvement will be easier to deny. In early April 1961, Kennedy gives his approval. On April 15, eight B-26 bombers attack Cuban airfields; Kennedy holds back further air support. Two days later, Brigade 2506 lands. Three days after that, it is all over.
Connection to the team principle
The plan arrived in the room ready-made from outside, backed by experienced specialists. In a situation like that, agreement becomes the norm and objection becomes a disruption. No one had to forbid dissent. It was enough that no one asked for it.
Doubts That Never Reached the Table
Situation
According to Irving L. Janis, Kennedy’s circle of advisers accepted the CIA’s plan uncritically. There were objections, though. Kennedy’s adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had doubts but played them down himself in the meetings. Senator J. William Fulbright objected, to no effect. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and military officers later said they had had reservations and kept quiet. The consequences hit the CIA first: Allen Dulles resigned at the end of November 1961, and Richard Bissell and Deputy Director Charles Cabell also had to go. The prisoners were not released until December 1962, in exchange for food and medicine worth about $53 million.
Connection to the team principle
The group was not united. It only looked that way. Several smart people had reservations, and each kept them to themselves or watered them down. Irving L. Janis called this pattern groupthink: the drive for unanimity crowds out any real weighing of alternatives. He counted self-censorship among its hallmarks. Apparent unity is the most dangerous kind of unity, because it lulls the leader into a false sense of security.
October 1962: A Different Approach
Situation
On October 14, 1962, a U-2 reconnaissance plane photographs Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba. Two days later Kennedy is briefed, and that same day he convenes a group of advisers that would become known as ExComm. Six options are on the table, from doing nothing and diplomacy to an air strike, an invasion and a naval blockade. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously call for an attack and an invasion. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argues for the blockade. According to Irving L. Janis’s account, this time Kennedy works differently. He brings in outside experts. He lets members consult trusted people in their own departments. He splits the group into subgroups. And he deliberately stays away from some meetings so as not to steer opinion in advance.
Connection to the team principle
In 1962 Kennedy does not appoint a dissenter. He builds a process in which dissent can emerge. Subgroups reach different conclusions. Outsiders owe the group nothing. And when the boss is absent, no one can tell him what he wants to hear. Sometimes the most powerful thing a leader can do for open dissent is to leave the room.
Thirteen Days
Situation
By October 19 the majority has shifted toward the blockade. On October 22 Kennedy announces it on television; two days later it takes effect. On October 27 a U-2 is shot down over Cuba, killing its pilot, Rudolf Anderson. Kennedy decides against retaliation. On October 28 Nikita Khrushchev backs down. The settlement includes a secret pledge to withdraw American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The blockade ends on November 20, 1962.
Connection to the team principle
The military’s unanimous advice did not carry the day, because it had to hold its own against other voices. The decision took days instead of hours, and it was a better one. Dissent costs time. That week, it was time well spent.
What Is Disputed About This Reading
Situation
The reading “same team, two processes” comes from Irving L. Janis, and it is contested. In 1998, drawing on more recently available records, Roderick M. Kramer concluded that the role of groupthink in the Bay of Pigs had been overstated; Kennedy, he argued, had sought more outside advice and decided more on his own than Irving L. Janis assumed. The theory itself is also only partly supported. In 1998, after 25 years of research, Marlene E. Turner and Anthony R. Pratkanis took stock and found the empirical support to be mixed. What is more, the membership of the two groups was similar but not identical. And Kennedy had the ExComm meetings secretly recorded – he knew something the others did not.
Connection to the team principle
The example is a teaching case, not proof. You cannot conclude from it that cohesion makes teams stupid. A narrower finding is better supported. In a 2006 experiment, Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Felix C. Brodbeck, Andreas Mojzisch, Rudolf Kerschreiter and Dieter Frey had 135 three-person groups make a personnel decision. Groups whose members all held the same opinion beforehand almost never found the best solution. Where opinions differed at the outset, the discussion was more thorough and the right decision was reached more often.
Key takeaways
Key Lessons
- On important decisions, hold back your own opinion until the others have spoken. Or leave the room for an hour.
- Before big decisions, split your team into two groups that work separately. Then compare the results together.
- Bring in someone from outside who owes the team nothing.
- Ask explicitly for concerns – from every single person. Silence is not consent.
- When a plan comes ready-made from experts, scrutinize it all the more. Expertise is no substitute for a dissenting voice.
Summary
At the Bay of Pigs in 1961, a plan fails – one that several of those involved had doubted without saying so clearly. In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, according to Irving L. Janis’s account, Kennedy makes sure that different voices are heard – through subgroups, outside experts and his own absence. Historians and psychologists dispute this interpretation. As an image, it remains powerful: the more a team agrees, the more urgently it needs someone who disagrees. And it is the leader’s job to make room for that.